

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 BONN 07894 01 OF 03 161811Z

45

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 IO-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20

USIA-15 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OIC-04 AEC-11 OMB-01 SAM-01

DRC-01 EB-11 /163 W

----- 046508

R 161756Z MAY 74

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2592

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USMISSION GENEVA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 07894

VIENNA FOR MBFR DEL

GENEVA FOR CSCE DEL

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, GW

SUBJECT: MBFR VERIFICATION

REFS: (A) USNATO 2440, (B) STATE 101849, (C) BONN 7169,

(D) BONN 5335 AND USNATO 1832, (E) BONN 4583,

(F) BONN 3785

BEGIN SUMMARY: EMBASSY BELIEVES OPPOSITION TO OVERT
VERIFICATION OF POST-MBFR-I FORCE LEVELS HAS MATURED
WITHIN FOREIGN OFFICE AND DEFENSE MINISTRY AND ALSO HAS
ENGAGED ATTENTION OF SENIOR POLICY LEVEL OFFICIALS. WE
BELIEVE GERMANS WILL AWAIT U.S. ANSWERS TO FRG QUESTIONS
POSED IN REF D BEFORE CONSIDERING ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS
FOR OVERT INSPECTION. IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT GERMANS
WILL MOVE MUCH BEYOND MBFR I NTM/EXIT-REENTRY POINT

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 BONN 07894 01 OF 03 161811Z

PACKAGE ALREADY PRESENTED. SECOND PHASE MAY RPT MAY BE

ANOTHER MATTER, BUT FRG MEASURING STICK WILL REMAIN LONGER ON POLITICAL THAN STRICT VERIFICATION CONSIDERATIONS. END SUMMARY

1. WE FULLY SHARE U.S.NATO VIEW (REF A) THAT THERE IS LITTLE PROSPECT TO SELL OCTOBER 5 U.S. POSITION ON OVERT VERIFICATION OF MBFR I FORCE LEVELS TO FRG. DURING THE LAST FEW MONTHS, THE SUSPICIONS OF DISARMAMENT COMMISSIONER ROTH AND MBFR EXPERT RUTH CONCERNING THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF EXTENSIVE VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS HAVE EVOLVED INTO FIRM CONVICTIONS. MOREOVER, THE APPREHENSIONS OF ROTH, RUTH AND FONOFF VERIFICATION EXPERTS HAVE PERSUADED POLITICAL DIRECTOR VAN WELL AND OUTGOING FONOFF STATE SECRETARY FRANK THAT THE FRG SHOULD BE VIGILANT IN OPPOSING MBFR I ARRANGEMENTS - EITHER CONSTRAINTS OR VERIFICATION - THAT WOULD SMACK OF A CENTRAL EUROPEAN SPECIAL DISARMAMENT ZONE LIMITED ESSENTIALLY TO THE TWO GERMANIES. WHILE DEFENSE MINISTRY OFFICIALS OCCASIONALLY ARGUE THE MERITS OF OVERT VERIFICATION WITH US ON MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE GROUNDS, AUTHORITATIVE DEFMIN OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGETHE FONOFF POSITION THAT SUCH VERIFICATION WOULD BE POLITICALLY UNACCEPTABLE IN PHASE I.

2. OF LATE, VAN WELL HAS SHOWN HIMSELF TO BE PERSONALLY ENGAGED ON THESE ISSUES. IN MAY 3 TALK WITH DEAN, VAN WELL VIGOROUSLY OPPOSED GOING BEYOND NTM - EXIT/REENTRY POINT PACKAGE IN MBFR I. IN SAME CONVERSATION, WITH VAN WELL NODDING HIS AGREEMENT, RUTH TERMED PERMANENT MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS IN MBFR I "SIMPLY UNACCEPTABLE TO BONN."

3. IN MAY 15 TALK WITH THE AMBASSADOR ON UNRELATED MATTERS, VAN WELL RAISED THE TOPIC OF CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES, MAKING THE POINT THAT IT IS OF "GREAT IMPORTANCE" TO THE FRG THAT CBM'S HAVE THE BROADEST POSSIBLE GEOGRAPHICAL APPLICATION IN ORDER TO DISSIPATE THE IDEA OF A SPECIAL ZONE. VAN WELL TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT CBM'S ARE IMPORTANT TO BONN AND THE FRG "DOES NOT WISH TO MORTGAGE THE FUTURE OF EUROPE BY ATTACHING UNDUE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 BONN 07894 01 OF 03 161811Z

IMPORTANCE TO TERRITORY," BUT THE GEOGRAPHICAL ISSUE IS AN ESSENTIAL ONE FOR BONN - BOTH IN CSCE AND MBFR. IN SEPARATE RECENT TALKS WITH EMBOFF, RUTH HAS BEEN RECALLING THE IMPORTANCE OF TREATING THE HUNGARIAN QUESTION IN AN MBFR NON-CIRCUMVENTION AND/OR NON-INCREASE OF FORCES AGREEMENT IN ORDER FURTHER TO DILUTE THE AREA PROBLEM. THIS SAME GERMAN SENSITIVITY ON THE AREA ISSUE ALSO COMES THROUGH IN THE EVER MORE CAUTIOUS COMMENTS

OF RUTH AND ROTH ON STABILIZING MEASURES (BONN 5334)

4. IN ALL OF OUR RECENT CONTACTS, THREE POINTS HAVE
MATERIALIZED AS THE GRAVAMEN OF GERMAN THINKING. FIRST,
GIVEN POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS AND THE FACT THAT REDUCTIONS

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 BONN 07894 02 OF 03 161813Z

45

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 IO-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20

USIA-15 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OIC-04 AEC-11 OMB-01 SAM-01

DRC-01 EB-11 /163 W

----- 046531

R 161756Z MAY 74

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2593

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USMISSION GENEVA

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 03 BONN 07894

AND CONSTRAINTS WILL BE LIMITED TO U.S./SOVIET FORCES
IN PHASE I, THERE SHOULD BE ONLY AS MUCH VERIFICATION
AS NECESSARY RATHER THAN AS MUCH AS NEGOTIABLE. SECOND,
THE CHARACTER OF MBFR II WILL BE QUITE DIFFERENT THAN
MBFR I, THUS PERMITTING SOMEWHAT MORE ELABORATE
ASSOCIATED MEASURES, INCLUDING VERIFICATION, IN PHASE
II. THIRD, THE FRG NEEDS U.S. ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
CONCERNING NTM, EXIT/REENTRY POINTS AND RESTRICTIONS OF
VERIFICATION TO GERMAN TERRITORY BEFORE CONCLUDING
DEFINITELY "HOW LITTLE VERIFICATION IS ENOUGH." WE

DO NOT EXPECT MUCH FRG MOVEMENT ON THE SUBSTANCE OF VERIFICATION ISSUES BEFORE THE USG IS IN A POSITION TO INFORM THE GERMANS WHETHER AND TO WHAT EXTENT EXIT/REENTRY POINT ARRANGEMENTS, AS SUPPLEMENTED BY NTM, ARE OR ARE NOT OBJECTIVELY ADEQUATE FOR MBFR I. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT FRG IS ALSO ENGAGED IN ITS OWN STUDIES ON THESE MATTERS. BONN ALSO WILL WISH TO HEAR FURTHER FROM
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 BONN 07894 02 OF 03 161813Z

THE U.S. CONCERNING THE NTM PARTICIPATION AND ROTTERDAM QUESTIONS.

THE NECESSITY OF ADDITIONAL OVERT MEASURES FOR PHASE I, WE WOULD EXPECT THE FRG TO MAINTAIN ITS POSITION THAT FURTHER VERIFICATION OF POST-WITHDRAWAL FORCE LEVELS SHOULD BE DEFERRED UNTIL MBFR II. VAN WELL AND ROTH STRONGLY WISH TO AVOID BUNDESTAG RATIFICATION PROCEEDINGS IN CONNECTION WITH THE FIRST AGREEMENT AND FEAR THAT INTRODUCING MORE POST-WITHDRAWAL VERIFICATION IN THE FRG COULD IN POLITICAL TERMS REQUIRE BUNDESTAG ASSENT AND THUS ENGENDER A POTENTIALLY FRACTIOUS PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE.

6. THE GERMANS DO NOT BELIEVE THEIR PROPOSALS DISPENSE WITH OVERT VERIFICATION ONCE WITHDRAWALS HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. THEY THINK THE NTM-EXIT/REENTRY PACKAGE IS OBJECTIVELY SUFFICIENT AND POLITICALLY TOLERABLE FOR MBFR I, AND, IN ANY CASE, REPRESENTS THE OUTSIDE LIMITS OF SOVIET READINESS TO COMPROMISE. IN THIS SENSE, AND GIVEN THE FACT THAT AN MBFR I COMPACT WOULD NOT ENTAIL VERIFICATION OF SOVIET TERRITORY, THE GERMANS PROFESS NOT TO UNDERSTAND WHY THE U.S. IS PRESSING FOR FURTHER OVERT INSPECTION.

7. AS MENTIONED BY U.S.NATO (REF A - PARA 6), ROTH AND OTHER FRG AUTHORITIES OCCASIONALLY HAVE REFERRED TO THE CONCEPT OF INSPECTION BY CHALLENGE. BUT THE GERMAN IDEA IS TO CRANK UP SUCH A CHALLENGE MACHINERY ONLY AFTER SUPPORTING EVIDENCE OF A VIOLATION HAD BEEN MARSHALLED AND DISCUSSIONS BY A SALT STYLE STANDING CONTROL COMMISSION HAD PROVED FUTILE. U.S.NATO'S PROPOSALS IN PARAS 6 AND 7 ARE, IN OUR VIEW, UNLIKELY TO TEMPT BONN IN TERMS OF PHASE I.

8. WE EVEN MORE CONVINCED THAT THE GERMANS WOULD CONSIDER U.S. ASSURANCES REGARDING THE TEMPORARY CHARACTER OF MOBILE INSPECTION (REF A - PARA 8, 9 AND 10) UNACCEPTABLE IN PHASE I. AND LIKE U.S.NATO (PARA 11), WE TEND TO WONDER IF SUCH ASSURANCES WOULD NOT ACTUALLY UNDERMINE THE EFFICIENCY OF VERIFICATION MEASURES THE U.S. WOULD BE WORKING SO HARD TO SELL - FIRST TO BONN AND,

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 BONN 07894 02 OF 03 161813Z

IF SUCCESSFUL, THEREAFTER TO MOSCOW.

9.FURTHER ON THE MOBILE TEAM POINT, RUTH HAS TOLD US

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 BONN 07894 03 OF 03 161816Z

45

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 IO-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20

USIA-15 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OIC-04 AEC-11 OMB-01 SAM-01

DRC-01 EB-11 /163 W

----- 046588

R 161756Z MAY 74

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2594

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USMISSION GENEVA

S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 03 BONN 07894

THAT THE BELGIANS HAVE VOICED SOME UNDERSTANDING TO
HIM REFRG WISH TO DEFER THE ISSUE UNTIL PHASE II.
WE HAVE REPEATEDLY SOUGHT TO PERSUADE THE GERMANS TO
SUPPORT THE BRITISH IDEA - I.E., THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD
PROPOSE BOTH FIXED AND MOBILE VERIFICATION TEAMS TO THE
SOVIETS AND BE PREPARED TO SETTLE FOR ONLY FIXED POSTS

IF, AS IS LIKELY, THE WARSAW PACT REJECTS MOBILE TEAMS.
THE GERMAN REACTION HAS USUALLY BEEN - "OK, BUT IT MUST
BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD WITHIN THE ALLIANCE THAT
THE WEST WILL REJECT MOBILE VERIFICATION OF POST
MBFR I FORCE LEVELS SHOULD THE PACT ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL."
LATELY, GIVEN THE AUGMENTED POLICY LEVEL OPPOSITION TO
SUCH PHASE I OVERT VERIFICATION, EVEN THE "OK, BUT"
APPROACH HAS BECOME BLURRED. ON THE OTHER HAND, GIVEN
THE REPORTED BELGIAN COMMENTS TO RUTH ON THE MOBILE
TEAM ISSUE, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOME TACTICAL VARIATION
OF THE U.S.NATO PROPOSAL IN REF A - PARA 14 MIGHT WORK.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 BONN 07894 03 OF 03 161816Z

10. IN SUM, FRG POLICY MAKERS AND MBFR EXPERTS ARE
PREPARED TO ACCEPT AN NTM/EXIT-REENTRY PACKAGE TO
VERIFY POST-WITHDRAWAL U.S./SOVIET FORCE LEVELS
FOLLOWING MBFR-I. BARRING HIGHLY PERSUASIVE U.S.
REPLIES TO FRG QUESTIONS ON THESE ISSUES, IT SEEMS
UNLIKELY BONN WOULD ASSENT TO BROADENINGSIGNIFICANTLY
THE SCOPE OF SUCH MEASURES. BUT VAN WELL, ROTH AND
RUTH HAVE REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED A READINESS TO CONSIDER
MORE ELABORATE MEASURES - PARTICULARLY THE INSPECTION
BY CHALLENGE IDEA - IN MBFR II. THIS REPRESENTS NO
ASSURANCE CONCERNING MBFR-II VERIFICATION. BUT SOME
GERMAN OFFICIALS ARE SKEPTICAL AS TO WHETHER MBFR II
WILL EVER ARRIVE, AND PENDING MBFR II, BONN IS ARGUING.
AGAINST POLITICALLY ENTANGLING ENGAGEMENTS REGARDING
GERMAN TERRITORY.
HILLENBRAND

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: NUCLEAR ENERGY, EAST WEST SECURITY MEETINGS, MILITARY POLICIES, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, NEGOTIATIONS, FORCE & TROOP LEVELS, MILITARY AGREEMENTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 16 MAY 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974BONN07894
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740121-0428, D740122-0658
From: BONN
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740544/aaaabmjh.tel
Line Count: 311
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: (A) USNATO 2440, (B) STATE 101849, (, C) BONN 7169
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 26 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <26 MAR 2002 by collinp0>; APPROVED <08 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR VERIFICATION
TAGS: PARM, GE
To: STATE DOD
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005